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Abstract
We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly
growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other
months in a sample of low and middle income countries. We hypothesize this is
related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authori-
tarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced
cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in
close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditure, we show that
within household consumption of food increases in the days before elections.
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1 Introduction
The theory of political business cycles in monetary aggregates, pioneered by Nordhaus
(1975) and MacRae (1977) and given its modern, rational choice interpretation by Persson
and Tabellini (1990), predicts monetary expansions in the quarters leading up to an
election and an election-time economic boom. The ultimate goal is to help the incumbent
government win votes. Empirical tests of this theory have, however, fared badly and the
evidence on monetary political cycles of the classical Nordhaus-MacRae type is weak,
as pointed out in the surveys by Paldam (1997) and Drazen (2001). We provide new
evidence on the monetary effects of elections and strive to offer an alternative perspective
on the money-election nexus. In contrast to past work on monetary political cycles which
emphasizes deliberate manipulations of monetary policy instruments by the central bank
in the quarters prior to elections, we argue that the effect is concurrent with elections
and works through money demand rather than through supply side interventions by the
central bank.
We investigate if the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M1 – defined as the total
amount of cash in circulation plus transferable deposits held by all money holding sectors
– increases in election months in a panel of up to 104 low and middle income countries
for the years 1975-2015. We estimate a dynamic short-run money demand function.
Our baseline specification is a dynamic panel model with year, month and country fixed
effects. In a more demanding specification, we include interactions between these fixed
effects and thus identify the effect of elections on the growth rate of M1 by testing if,
within an election year, the growth rate of M1 is higher during the month of an election,
after removing common shocks that happen within a month in a given year and country-
specific seasonality. We find evidence of an increase in the growth rate of M1 in election
and post-election months in these countries. The effect is sizable: the growth rate of M1,
on average, increases by between 0.41 and 0.61 percentage points or by about 1/13th of
a standard deviation in election months. We are unable to find similar effects among
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established OECD democracies. These results are remarkably robust and suggest that
the election calendar induces concurrent fluctuations in M1 that can only be detected by
studying high-frequency (monthly) data. The evidence on this monetary expansion in
the election month in non-OECD countries with elections – which we shall refer to as the
election date effect – is new to the literature and robustly establishing this new stylized
fact is a main contribution of the paper.
To explain the election date effect, we propose the vote buying hypothesis according to
which the effect is a manifestation of systemic vote buying. Vote buying – understood as
payments in exchange for voting in a particular way or for showing up to vote – requires
significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before the election is held. This increases
the demand for money and affects (recorded) M1 around elections. The resources needed
to buy votes may be obtained by converting illiquid into liquid assets. This substitution
from broad money into cash or deposits directly increases M1. On the other hand, vote
buying is an illegal activity and the funds may come from the shadow economy. Once
such shadow economy cash hoardings are used to buy votes, a fraction of them turns into
deposits in banks. This will, in turn, increase the banks’ ability to lend and offer leeway
for an increase in M1. Finally, if overseas funds are converted to local currency to fund
vote buying, then this will, in fixed or managed exchange rate systems, increase M1. In
all cases, the result is an increase in M1 centered around elections.
We offer four pieces of evidence that vote buying is a possible explanation for the
election date effect but a conclusive case cannot be made. First, vote buying, as a viable
electoral strategy, requires weak democratic institutions, poorly conducted elections, and
an electorate willing to “sell” their votes. By drawing on data from hundreds of reports
from international election monitors (Kelley 2012), we test this implication. Consistent
with the vote buying hypothesis, we find that the increase in the growth rate of M1
is systematically larger in elections which according to international election monitors
were far from “free and fair” or were riddled with “electoral fraud” and “vote buying”.
In particular, we cannot find evidence of an election date effect in elections that were
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reported by the monitors to be free and fair. Second, large-scale vote buying does not
usually occur in countries with consolidated “authoritarian” political institutions where
the elections are heavily controlled by the incumbent government eliminating the need to
buy votes or conversely in countries with strong democratic institutions where checks and
balances make large-scale vote buying impossible. Consistent with this line of reasoning,
we find that the election date effect exhibits an inverse U-shaped relation with indicators
on the quality of a country’s political institutions: the election date effect is statistically
significant only for countries in between the two extremes. Third, we also find evidence
that the election date effect is largest in close elections during which competition among
candidates is intense and vote buying of greatest value. Fourth, vote buying can affect
M1 by funding extra consumption. This happens, for example, if the cash used to buy
votes was hoarded in the black economy and returns to the banking system when voters
spend it. To provide evidence on this mechanism, we undertake a micro-econometric
study of anomalies in household consumption around elections in Armenia. Armenia
exhibits a marked increase of currency in circulation in the days around the elections it
has held since 2003 and reports from international election monitors and in the local press
are full of anecdotal evidence of vote buying on a massive scale. Using daily household
level consumption diaries from a large consumption survey, we adopt the approach first
developed by Mitra et al. (2017) in a study of vote buying in India. We find that
consumption expenditures on many food items spike in the days around elections. A
plausible funding source for this extra consumption is income earned by selling votes.
Our paper contributes directly to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to
the research on monetary political business cycles with a new stylized fact: the growth
rate of M1 is systematically higher around elections and this cannot be explained by
country-specific macro-economic shocks in election years, by common shocks that affect
all countries in a given month, or by country-specific seasonality. In doing so, we shift the
attention away from central bank engineered cycles of the type proposed by Nordhaus
(1975) and MacRae (1977) to cycles created at the demand side of the money market
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around elections. Second, we contribute to the literature on vote buying by suggesting
that systemic, large-scale vote buying has aggregate monetary effects. Specifically, we
add to an emerging literature that relates illegal but unobserved electoral activities to
observable anomalies timed around elections. Kapur and Vaishnav (2013) shows that
Indian construction firms divert short-term funds to political campaigns (in anticipation
of post-electoral preferential treatment) and that this induces a short-term election cycle
in cement consumption in the election and post-election month. The macroeconomic
effect on M1 that we find is also concentrated in the election and post-election month.
Sukhtankar (2012) finds evidence of an election cycle in the prices paid by sugar mills
in India. This is consistent with illegal campaign funding activities and such activities
could, in principle, fund vote buying (as well as other election expenses). Finally, Mitra
et al. (2017) study consumption data from across Indian states and identify anomalies in
consumption patterns which are consistent with vote buying. Our work relates directly
to this by showing similar evidence from Armenia.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data, iden-
tification strategy, and the main results. Section 3 discuses evidence on the monetary
mechanisms behind the election date effect. Section 4 introduces the vote buying hypoth-
esis and presents evidence consistent with it. Section 5 concludes. The supplementary
material contains extra estimation results, case-study evidence and a simple model of the
money market that illustrates the possible links between vote buying and M1.
2 A new monetary election cycle
Existing models of political business cycles in monetary aggregates emphasize that politi-
cians who seek reelection will employ monetary instruments to generate a favorable eco-
1 Zitzewitz (2012) reviews the literature that uses the tool-kit of applied economics to
detect illegal behavior, including corruption. For reviews of the literature on corruption,
see Aidt (2003), Pande (2008) or Olken and Pande (2012).
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nomic environment prior to an election.2 Accordingly, any monetary expansion must
start well before the election date to have the desired effect on the real economy. Both
conceptually and empirically, the relevance of such monetary policy cycles remains con-
tested (Drazen 2001). The independence of central banks from elected governments
makes the theory questionable in many countries and uncertainty about the monetary
transmission mechanism makes it unpractical. Empirically, the evidence is mixed.3 In
contrast to the existing empirical literature, which studies quarterly or annual data, we
study monthly data and find robust evidence of a monetary cycle in the growth rate of
M1 centered around elections. This stylized fact is new to the literature.
2.1 Data
To establish the new stylized fact, we study two panels of countries for which we can
observe M1 at the monthly frequency for the years between 1975 and 2015. The primary
sample consists of up to 104 non-OECD countries while the secondary sample consists
of 17 OECD countries.4 The unit of analysis is a country, year and month triple. To be
included in the sample, a country must hold elections and its central bank must report
monthly data on M1 to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a consequence, the
panels are unbalanced. Data on M1 are published by International Monetary Fund (2018)
and are recorded at the end of each month. We obtain data on election months from the
2 The original Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) models focus on a Phillips curve
trade-off between inflation and unemployment and predict an expansion of monetary
aggregates or a reduction in central bank rates prior to the election. Alesina et al.
(1997, Chapter 1) offers an overview of these models.
3 See, for example, Alesina et al. (1992, 1993); Drazen (2001); Heckelman and Wood
(2005); Alpanda and Honig (2009); Dreher and Vaubel (2009); Klose (2012).
4 OECD membership is defined as of 2009. Our estimates remain robust if we define
OECD membership as of 1975 or 2017, see Table A5, columns (7), (8), (12), (13) and
(14) in the supplementary material.
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Database of Political Institutions (DPI) constructed by Beck et al. (2001) and data on
election dates from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2015). Table A1
in the supplementary material lists the countries in the two samples.




αi∆ lnM1cym−i + β0Ecym + β1∆ ln Ycy + β2∆ lnRcym (1)
+β3∆ lnPcy +Xcyβ4 + µc + ηy + vm + εcym.
The dependent variable - ∆lnM1 - is the growth rate of M1, where M1 is defined as the
total amount of cash in circulation plus transferable deposits held by all money holding
sectors, in country c and month m in year y.5 Short-run money demand is a function
of past growth in M1 (between one and six lags), the annual growth rate of the price
level (P ), the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (Y ) and, in some specifications,
the monthly change in the nominal interest rate (R).6 The vector X includes control
variables in levels measured for countries and years: GDP per capita, a proxy for wealth
(resource rents as a share of GDP), the exchange rate against the US dollar,7 the quality
5 One reason we take the growth rates of M1 as our dependent variable rather than its
levels is that M1 is measured in national currency. The data quality also varies from
country to country. Consequently we trim the data on ∆lnM1 at its bottom and top
one percentiles. Our estimates remain robust to alternative strategies, see Table A5,
columns (5) and (6) in the supplementary material.
6 We proxy the short-run nominal interest rate by the monthly interest rate on treasury
bonds. These data come from International Monetary Fund (2018) and are only
available for around half of the countries in our sample. Consequently, we do not
include the interest rate variable in most specifications.
7 The source of these data is World Development Indicators (2014). Resource rents are
the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and
forest rents.
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of institutions proxied by the Polity IV index normalized between zero and one (Center for
Systematic Peace 2015), and for whether a country in a given year is a new democracy in
the sense of Brender and Drazen (2005).8 Table A2 in the supplementary material reports
summary statistics and data sources. All specifications include country (µ), year (η) and
month (ν) fixed effects. In more demanding specifications, we seasonally adjust the data
on M1, as well as replacing country, year and month fixed effects with country×year,
year×month and country×month fixed effects. ε is the error term.9
The main variable of interest is E. It captures the timing of elections and is coded
in two alternative ways. The main coding records the month in which an election takes
place. This can be coded for all elections in our samples. Specifically, the dummy variable
Election month is defined as being equal to one if at least one election takes place in
country c in month m and year y and zero otherwise. The second coding – Election day
– in the spirit of Franzese (2000), takes into account the precise timing of an election
within a month. It is equal to the election date divided by 31 for the election month and
zero otherwise.10
8 Brender and Drazen (2005) define a country as being a new democracy during its first
four elections following a transition from autocracy (negative score on the Polity IV
index) to democracy (non-negative score on the Polity IV index) after which it becomes
an old democracy.
9 We cluster the errors at the level of countries. A small fraction of our monthly
observations corresponds to elections and, for this reason, it may be better to bootstrap
the errors than to cluster. We find that the bootstrapped and cluster standard errors
are very similar. Table A5, column (4) in the supplementary material reports a
representative specification with bootstrapped standard errors (based on 1000
replications).
10 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2015) provides information on the
exact election days from 1998 onward. Election day is not coded for the elections before
then. The rationale for the particular coding of Election day is that M1 is recorded at
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The parameter of interest is β0. It measures the election date effect: the increase (or
decrease) in the growth rate of M1 in election months relative to non-election months
within a given country and year. It can be given a causal interpretation if the timing
of elections, conditional on the controls and the three-ways fixed effects (or interactions
thereof), is unrelated to ε. 11
2.2 The average election date effect
Table 1, columns (1) to (4) report the baseline estimates of the average election date
effect as captured by the Election month and Election day variables. Columns (1) and
(2) show specifications with the seven main time-varying controls. Columns (3) and (4)
add controls for the level, lag and change in the treasury bill rate for the smaller sub-
sample of countries for which this information is available. All these specifications of
equation (1) include year, month and country fixed effects and three lags of the monthly
growth rate of M1.12 The specifications utilize the maximum number of country-year pair
observations available (the total sample) in each case, and the number of observations,
therefore, varies from column to column. In all cases, we find a significant (at the five
percent level or better) increase in the growth rate of M1 in election months. In the
the end of the month. An election that takes place at the end of the month gets weight
1, while an election that takes place at the beginning gets weight 1/31.
11 We estimate equation (1) with a fixed effects estimator. In the dynamic
specifications, this causes Nickell’s bias. However, since our data are monthly, we have
over 500 time periods, so the size of the bias is likely to be very small. We have
nonetheless estimated equation (1) with a difference-GMM estimator which instruments
the lagged dependent variables with their lags. The results, which are reported Table
A5, columns (10) and (11) in the supplementary material, are very similar to those
obtained with the fixed effects estimator.
12 Table A5 in the supplementary material reports additional dynamic specifications
with up to six lags and shows that the results are very similar.
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baseline specification in column (1), the average election month increase in the growth
rate of M1 is 0.54 percentage points. This corresponds to about 1/13th of a standard
deviation. Column (2) reports the corresponding result for Election day which takes into
account the precise timing of the election within a month. The average election day effect
is positive and significant. The effects are a little larger when we control for the interest
rate (columns (3) and (4)).13
The baseline specification in equation (1) includes country, year and month fixed ef-
fects and estimates the election date effect using within country variation across years
and months. We can restrict the variation further to engage with three potentially con-
founding factors. First, we can control for country×year fixed effects. This enables us
to identify the election date effect from high-frequency changes in the growth rate of
M1 happening before an election while controlling for all other country-specific macro-
economic changes that may occur during election years.14 Second, we can control for
month×year fixed effects. Unlike the month fixed effects in the baseline specification,
this controls for common macro shocks, such as a financial crisis, international financial
flows etc., that affect all countries in a given month within a year. Finally, the monthly
data exhibit a high degree of seasonality. We can control for this by seasonally adjusting
the monthly M1 series for each country with the X12-ARIMA procedure used by the US
Census Bureau and via country×month fixed effects.15
13 The range of the observed monthly growth rate in M1 is from -11 to 19%. Table A5,
columns (5) and (6) in the supplementary material exclude the 1% and 5% most
extreme values of M1, respectively, and show that the estimate of the election date
effect is not sensitive to outliers.
14 In the baseline, such country-specific macro-economic effects are picked up by the
control variables.
15 The combination of these three interactions subsumes the country, year and month





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1, columns (6) to (9) report specifications that include these three combinations
of fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (8) and (9) is the growth rate of
seasonally adjusted M1. Columns (10) to (14) show the corresponding results for the
smaller sample where we can control for the interest rate. As discussed above, the data
on election months, election days and the control variables are available for different
samples and the seasonal adjustment implies a small loss of observations. To ensure
comparability across these regressions, we fix the sample such that the country-year pairs
are the same across columns (5) to (9) and (10) to (14), respectively. Columns (5) and
(10) replicate the baseline regressions without interacted fixed effects on the two “fixed
samples” and confirm the baseline results.
These specifications identify the election date effect by testing if, within an election
year, the growth rate of M1 is higher during the month of an election, after remov-
ing common shocks and country-specific seasonality. The coefficient on election month
is 0.0041 without seasonally adjusting the data (column (6)) and 0.0037 with seasonal
adjustment (column (8)). In both cases, the estimates are smaller than the correspond-
ing estimate in column (5) but significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Columns (7) and (9) show the corresponding results for election day and columns (10) to
(14) show the results for the smaller sample for which interest rate data is available. In
all cases, the election date effect is statistically significant. These results show that the
baseline estimates are remarkably robust and that the election date effect that we find is
not an artifact of common shocks (month×year fixed effect), country-specific seasonality
(country×month fixed effects) or country-specific macro-economic events within election
years (country×year fixed effects).
The elections in our sample are not spread uniformly across the year. October to
November typically host more elections while January hosts about half of the number of
elections happening during an average month of a year. Insofar as politicians can time
election dates within a certain time window (e.g., a calendar year) and they perceive it
to be beneficial to hold elections in months which are known, for seasonal reasons, to
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be associated with high economic activity and strong growth in M1, our results could
be driven by reverse causality. We include the month fixed effects to control for this
possibility in the baseline and we show that the results are robust to country-specific
month fixed effects and to seasonal adjustment of the data (columns (6) to (9)). We can
address the issue of strategic timing of elections more directly by restricting attention
to the 28 countries (n=4353) in our main sample that have fixed election days (for their
legislature) and where reverse causality by definition cannot be an issue. The estimate
of election month for this sub-sample, based on a specification similar to that reported
in Table 1, column (1) is equal to 0.012 with a standard deviation of 0.0040 and, thus,
significant at the 1% level. All in all, this suggests that the results are not due to timing
effects and reverse causality.
2.3 The timing of the election date effect
The evidence presented in Table 1 does not show whether the election date effect begins in
the months before the election and/or lingers into the months afterwards. To investigate
the timing of the effect, we estimate equation (1) with lags or leads of election month
included. Table A3 in the supplementary material reports the results. Column (1) shows
a specification with two leads and two lags while columns (3) to (6) show specifications
with each lag or lead on its own and column (2) shows, for comparison, a specification
with Election month. There is no evidence of any monetary expansion in the two months
before the election but there is evidence of an effect in the post-election month. The point
estimate on the post-election month dummy is larger than for the election month, but
not statistically different. This suggests that the monetary effect of elections persists into
the month after the election consistent with some lag in the monetary transmission.16
16 We have estimated specification with three lags and leads and the third lag/lead is
insignificant.
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2.4 The OECD sample
The sample of 17 “old” OECD countries is of particular interest because the “old” OECD
countries have long-established democratic institutions and, generally, score highly on
indexes of the quality of institutions (e.g., Freedom House 2012) and because they have
sophisticated monetary systems. We have estimated equation (1) on this sample and
Table A3, columns (7) to (12) in the supplementary material report the results. We find
no evidence of any monetary election cycle in the election month, nor in the months
before or after the election. The election date effect that we find is, therefore, present
only in the sample of non-OECD countries.
2.5 Legislative and executive elections
Our samples include a mixture of legislative and executive elections. For some countries,
executive and legislative elections take place on the same day. To investigate heterogeneity
in the election date effect across election types, we have split Election month into three
sub-indicators: one for legislative elections only; one for executive elections only; and one
for simultaneous legislative and executive elections.17 We, then, re-estimated equation
(1) with these refined Election month variables. Table A4, columns (1) to (4) in the
supplementary material report the results for the non-OECD sample; columns (5) to
(8) report the corresponding results for the OECD sample. We observe that the point
estimates are positive for the non-OECD sample, but that it is executive elections of the
head of state that drive the significance of the overall election date effect (column (3)).
Joint elections almost triples the size of the point estimate (column (4)). The results for
the OECD sample are not statistically significant.
In conclusion, our baseline result is a robust, statistically significant, and economically
meaningful monthly election cycle in the growth rate of M1 in non-OECD countries. The
17 We have 649 elections, of which 155 are only executive, 395 are only legislative, and
99 are simultaneous elections.
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effect is centred on the month of the election and lingers into the post-election month.
The effect is strongest in executive elections. On the other hand, we cannot detect the
effect in the sample of OECD countries. These empirical facts are new to the literature.
3 The monetary mechanism behind the election date
effect
Since M1 is endogenous to the monetary system, short-term fluctuations in M1 near
elections can reflect either shocks directly to the supply of the base money or shocks to
the demand for money that get accommodated through the banking system.18
First, the central bank can via open market operations, funding of government spend-
ing, or a change in its refinancing rate affect the supply of base money which, in turn,
affects M1. Second, short-term fluctuations in the demand for cash money can create
irregularities in the supply of money through three main channels. The first channel is
substitution from broad (M2 or M3) to narrow (M1) money. Transfers between cash and
bank deposits as such are neutral in their effect on M1, since this monetary aggregate is
defined as the sum of the two. However, if agents liquidate broader financial assets around
elections, then this substitution towards liquidity is recorded as an increase in M1. The
second channel originates from the mechanics of money multipliers. When cash, which
was previously hoarded outside of the banking system (e.g., in the shadow economy), is
used for transactions, it (partially) returns to the banking sector. This can happen in
two ways. First, the hoarded cash returns directly to banks if the recipients deposit it
or substitutes it for deposits that they would otherwise have withdrawn. This effect is
clearly strongest in societies with easy access to banking services. Secondly, the hoarded
cash also returns to the banks if the recipients spend the cash on goods and the retailers
18 In supplementary material appendix C, we sketch a simple model of the banking
sector that illustrates the economics of these various effects.
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subsequently deposit their revenue from these transactions in a bank.To the extent that
the hoarded cash returns to the banking system, the commercial banks experience an
increase in their reserves which increases their potential to lend. In the monetary ter-
minology, this reduction in cash hoardings increases, possibly with some lag, the money
multiplier and, hence, M1. Third, in a fixed or managed exchange rate system with a
convertible currency, an increase in the demand for local currency from abroad around
the time of elections will trigger appreciation pressure which must be accommodated by
liquidity from the central bank.
To discern the degree of active central bank involvement in generating the election
date effect, we ideally would study the growth rate in the supply of primary money (the
money base) around elections as this, rather than M1, is what the central bank controls.
Since the relevant data on a monthly frequency for a sufficient number of countries is
unavailable, we employ an alternative approach. We investigate the extent to which the
central banks in our sample of non-OECD countries use the discount window (rather than
open market operations) to induce an election-motivated expansion of the money base. If
so, the interest rate that the central bank charges its borrowers (formally the “refinancing
rate” as reported by the respective central banks) should fall in the months leading up
to an election. Monthly data on the refinancing rate is available from 21 central banks
in the non-OECD sample (Delta Stock 2018). Table 2, columns (1) to (6) show that the
central bank’s lending rate neither changes in the election month nor in the months prior
to or after that.
Another way the central bank could affect the growth rate of M1 in election months is to
fund short-term government spending directly.19 If so, the funds constitute an injection
of primary money into the economy and affect M1 directly. If this is the monetary
19 While most of literature on fiscal political cycles focus on deviations during the
election year (e.g. De Haan and Klomp 2013; Aidt and Mooney 2014), there is
evidence on short-run spending cycles of this sort. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)
document a sizable increase in direct monetary transfers to voters from the regional
16
Table 2: Refinancing rates and higher powered money
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Refinancing rate M1/(M2-M1) ∆lnM2 ∆lnM3
Election month -0.0065 -0.0064 0.1269** 0.0023 0.0013
(0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0616) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Election (t-2) 0.0082 0.0086
(0.0073) (0.0074)
Election (t-1) -0.0111 -0.0113
(0.0069) (0.0070)
Election (t+1) -0.0016 -0.0012
(0.0036) (0.0035)
Election (t+2) -0.0059 -0.0064
(0.0052) (0.0054)
Observations 3,326 3,326 3,326 3,326 3,326 3,326 20,170 20,170 10,106
R-squared 0.9485 0.9485 0.9485 0.9485 0.9485 0.9485 0.0221 0.0879 0.1205
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 101 101 49
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The variables Election (t+i) for i = −2,−1, 1, 2 are coded one in month i around the election. All
regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, the exchange rate, resource rents, polity index
of democracy, new democracy dummy; include three lags of the dependent variable; and country, year
and month fixed effects. In the sample with the 21 countries for which data on the refinancing rate can
be obtained in columns (1) to (6), the point estimate on election month is positive but not statistically
significant. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries.
mechanism behind the election date effect, then the effect should be stronger in countries
in which the central bank is under government influence (e.g., Berger et al. 2001). We
investigate this with the data on de jure central bank independence collected by Bodea
and Hicks (2015). Their CBI index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 reflecting maximum
independence, and is coded for 72 of the countries in the non-OECD sample covering the
years from 1975 to 2015.20 To this end, we augment equation (1) with CBI index and
its interaction with Election month. Figure 1(a) graphs the interaction effect showing
that the election date effect does not vary with the degree of central bank independence.
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This militates against the hypothesis that the election date effect is caused by public
spending funded directly by the central bank.21 Taken together, these results strongly
speak against active central bank intervention as the main explanation for the election
date effect.
To discern if the election date effect is caused by extra demand for cash, we can study
the degree of substitution from broad (M2 or M3) to narrow (M1) money in election
months.22 To do this, we study the M1
M2−M1 ratio around the election. We net out M1 in
the denominator because M1 is contained in M2 and we want to know if assets which are
part of M2 and not part of M1 are converted into M1 around the election. We also study
the growth rates of M2 and M3 directly. These should not increase in election months if
the increase in cash demand is funded entirely by liquidizing assets unique to M2 or M3.
Table 2, column (7) reports the results with M1
M2−M1 as the outcome variable. We observe
that the ratio is higher in election months than in other months. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that the election date effect is, in part, caused by substitution effects
from broad to narrow money. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the effect
governments of Russia in the days leading up to the election. Labonne (2016)
documents a short-term employment cycle in municipalities in the Philippines.
20 A central bank is coded as being more independent if its governors serve longer terms;
if the appointment and dismissal procedures for governors are insulated from the
government; if the bank’s mandate is focused on price stability; if the formulation of
monetary policy is in the hands of the central bank; and if the terms on central bank
lending to the government are restrictive.
21 The evidence presented in Alpanda and Honig (2009, 2010) supports this conclusion.
22 M2 comprises M1 plus deposits with agreed maturity up to two years and deposits
redeemable at notice up to three months. M3 comprises M2 plus repurchase
agreements, money market fund shares and money market papers, and debt securities
up to two years. The source of these data is International Monetary Fund (2018).
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Figure 1: The election date effect at different values of the central bank independence







































































Notes: The point estimates with 95% confidence intervals show the predicted marginal effects of elections
on the growth rate of M1 for different values of: (a) the central bank independence index ranging from
0 (lowest) to 1 (highest), and (b) the Polity IV index of democracy ranging from zero (lowest) to one
(highest). The bars in sub-figures (a) and (b) indicate the densities of, respectively, the central bank
independence index and the Polity IV index, and are measured on the right-hand y-axis. The sample
includes both non-OECD and OECD countries. The underlying regressions are reported in Table A7 in
the supplementary material.
of Election month on the growth rates of M2 (column (8)) and M3 (column (9)) are not
statistically significant.
4 The vote buying hypothesis
The election date effect is present only in the sample of non-OECD countries, many of
which have comparably weak electoral institutions, and not in established OECD democ-
racies.23 That fact that the cycle is timed around the election – in the election month and
23 Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006) and Hanusch and Keefer (2014),
amongst others, have previously shown that electoral politics in societies with
inexperienced or uninformed voters or with “young” political parties facilitates political
business cycles in government spending and other fiscal outcomes. Potrafke (2018)
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the month thereafter – and not in the months leading up to the election suggests that this
phenomenon cannot be explained by traditional political business cycle models that focus
on attempts by the incumbent government to manipulate monetary policy in the run-up
to an election with the aim of engineering favorable economic conditions. An alternative
explanation is required. We propose that the abnormally high monetary growth in the
election month may be indicative of systemic vote buying triggered by the effect it has on
cash demand.24 The political science and economics literature is abundant with surveys,
case studies, and field experimental evidence of systemic vote buying.25 The logic is that
vote buying requires liquid resources (cash) to be distributed to voters. This creates a
spike in the demand for money causing irregularities in the supply of money. Since vote
buying takes place close to an election, the effect on M1 is timed around the day of the
election. Accordingly, systemic vote buying will be detectable as a spike in the growth
rate of M1 within a short window around the election. The link between the extra cash
demand triggered by vote buying and M1 can, as discussed in section 3, operate through
substitution from broader assets to cash or through a short-run multiplier effect induced
by the return to the banking sector of hoarded cash that is spent on consumption goods.
We refer to this as the vote buying hypothesis.
reports evidence of an election cycle in perceived corruption. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008),
Hanusch and Keefer (2014) and Hidalgo and Nichter (2015) consider the link between
vote buying and political budget cycles in fiscal variables.
24 We use the term vote buying to refer to two related strategies. One strategy is to
offer a monetary payment as a direct exchange of cash for votes (see, e.g., Shefter 1977;
Heckelman and Yates 2002; Hicken 2011; Stokes et al. 2013; Aidt and Jensen 2017).
Another strategy is to buy turnout, i.e., to offer cash payments to induce core
supporters to cast their vote (see, e.g., Nichter 2014) or to induce opposition voters to
stay home (see, e.g., Cox and Kousser 1981).
25 See Stokes (2005),Finan and Schechter (2012),Wantchekon (2003), Vicente (2014) or
Hicken et al. (2015).
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Figure 2: The marginal effect of election month interacted with indicators of the quality
of elections.


















































































































































































































Notes: Each panel shows the point estimate of the interaction effect (the dot or solid line) and the 95%
confidence interval (bars or dotted lines), both measured on the left-hand vertical axis; the distribution of
observations is indicated with the gray blocks and is measured on the right-hand vertical axis. Panel (a)
reports the interaction effect evaluated at different values of the overall electoral quality index constructed
from the reports of the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe; panels (b) to (d) report
the interaction effect evaluated for different values of the election day cheating index. In panel (b) the
source of the election day cheating index is the US State Department; in panel (c) the election day
cheating index is the maximum (worst) score reported by any monitor for each election; in panel (d) the
election day cheating index is the average score across all available monitoring reports. The underlying
regressions are reported in Table A6 in the supplementary material.
We are not able to provide causal evidence in support of this hypothesis since we do
not observe any plausibly exogenous variation across elections in vote buying. However,
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we present four pieces of evidence that are consistent with the vote buying hypothesis,
but we cannot establish its validity conclusively.
4.1 Electoral irregularities
An implication of the vote buying hypothesis is that, within a country, the magnitude
of the election date effect should be larger in elections with a lot of vote buying than
in elections with less. Many of the elections included in the non-OECD sample were
subject to external monitoring by the European Union, the United Nations, the US
State Department or numerous non-governmental organizations. The purpose of such
monitoring is to verify if elections are fairly conducted, and to record and report any
irregularities. Drawing on Kelley (2012), who has systematized the information contained
in hundreds of monitoring reports for the period between 1978 and 2004,26 we can classify
elections according to how much vote buying the monitors observed.27
26 The data are coded in two separate datasets. The Dataset on International Election
Monitoring (DIEM) codifies the reports of external monitors and covers 108 countries
between 1980 and 2004. The Quality of Elections Dataset (QED) codifies the
information about the conduct of elections contained in the US State Department’s
annual country reports on human rights practices and covers 172 countries between
1978 and 2004. The advantage of these data is that they derive from a single source.
Kelley (2012, Appendix A) documents how the data were collected and coded. The
sources for the DIEM dataset are 673 mission reports from 21 international
organizations (including the Commonwealth Secretariat, the European Union, the
Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, African Union, the United Nations, or the Economic
Community of West African States).
27 We note that a potential problem with using the information from the monitoring
reports for this test is that not all elections are monitored and the selection into
monitoring is not random. In particular, governments intending to cheat might do what
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Our test adds the measures of election irregularities and their interaction with Election
month to equation (1) and re-estimate it on the sample for which monitoring data is
available. If the vote buying hypothesis is true, then the interaction effect should be
positive. Specifically, we use two quantitative measures of election irregularities. First,
the variable Overall election quality codes the summary assessment of the monitoring
organization regarding irregularities before, during and after an election. An election is
scored as a zero if the election is considered to be “free and fair” (acceptable) and is scored
as one if it does “not represent the will of the people” or if it is judged to be “fraudulent
and to fall short of international standards” (unacceptable). Elections in between these
extremes are given a score of 0.5. Second, the variable Election day cheating records
evidence of vote padding, inflated vote counts, ballot stuffing, double voting and vote
buying, etc. This is a direct measure of any irregularities that took place close to the
election. The original data are coded on a “no problems” to “major problems” scale in
four steps which we normalize to a point distribution between zero and one. To construct
these variables, we use the evaluations of the US State Department and the Organization
of Security and Co-operation in Europe, both of which must be considered relatively
objective and consistent observers, as well as the average or the maximum score from all
the monitoring reports available from Kelley (2012).
Figure 2 shows the point estimate of the interaction effect evaluated at different values
of Overall election quality (panel (a)) or Election day cheating (panels (b) to (d)). From
they can to discourage external monitoring. If so, this would bias our test against
finding evidence of the vote buying hypothesis. For our test, it would also be
problematic if the monitors overstated cheating in monitored elections during which M1
grew fast. These and other potential biases of these reports are discussed in Kelley
(2012, Chapter 4). We mitigate against potential biases by either drawing on the
reports of one organization over time (the bias would then approximately be the same
from year to year) or by averaging the reports associated with a particular election
across organizations.
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panel (a), we see that the election month increase in the growth rate of M1 is larger in
elections that are reported to be fraudulent and to fall short of international standards.
In fact, the election month effect is not statistically significant in elections which are free
and fair. Panels (b) to (d) show a similar picture for Election day cheating: the election
date effect is increasing in the extent of recorded vote buying and other election day
irregularities. These results provide support for the vote buying hypothesis.
4.2 The quality of institutions
The vote buying hypothesis implies that the size of the election date effect depends on
the quality of a country’s political institutions. In particular, large-scale vote buying
does not usually occur in countries with “authoritarian” political institutions where the
elections that do take place are tightly controlled by the ruling government party, making
vote buying redundant. Similarly, in countries with strong democratic institutions where
a vibrant press and other well-working checks and balances make large-scale vote buying
impossible. Vote buying, therefore, on a scale that can effect on M1 is most likely to
take place in countries with institutions in between these extremes, i.e., in countries with
contested elections that, because of prevailing institutional weaknesses, are susceptible to
vote buying (and other types of fraud). Given this, the vote buying hypothesis predicts
an inverse U-shaped relationship between the quality of a country’s political institutions
and the size of the election date effect.
To test this implication, we use the Polity IV index (Center for Systematic Peace
2015), normalized to be between zero (weak institutions) and one (strong institutions),
to quantify the “quality of political institutions”. We include the index and its square
along with interactions of the two with Election month in equation 1. To maximize the
range of the Polity IV index, we combine the non-OECD and OECD samples. Figure 1
plots the estimate of the election date effect at different values of the Polity IV index along
with 95% confidence intervals. We observe an inverse U-shaped relationship between the
size of the election date effect and the Polity IV index, with the pattern being clearer
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for the seasonally adjusted data (in panel (b)). The election date effect is statistically
significant only for countries located in the middle range of the index. Put the other way
around, the election date effect is neither significant in countries with a low Polity IV
scores and week institutions nor in those countries (belonging mostly in the OECD) with
a “perfect” Polity IV score of one. van Ham and Lindberg (2015) finds a similar effect
in their study of self-reported vote buying in Africa. Overall, this is consistent with the
vote buying hypothesis.
4.3 The closeness of elections
Another implication of the vote buying hypothesis is that vote buying is most likely
to be used as an electoral strategy in elections that are expected ex ante to be close.
Candidates and political parties have less incentive to buy vote if they are almost sure to
lose or to win.28 To test this implication, we approximate the “closeness” of an election by
the ex post vote share of the incumbent government party or coalition in parliamentary
elections and of the president in executive elections.29 We augment equation 1 with the
variable vote share and its square along with interactions of the two with Legislative
election or Executive election, respectively. Figure 3 shows that the election date effect
has an inverse U-shaped relation with the vote share of the incumbent in the non-OECD
countries. The effect is statistically significant in elections where the vote share of the
incumbent is between 40 and 60% in legislative elections (Figure 3(a)), and between 40
and 80% in executive elections (Figure 3(b)). This evidence is consistent with the vote
buying hypothesis. In interpreting this, we should bear in mind that the ex post outcome
28 The logic is similar to the result from the literature on probabilistic voting that
parties will promise post-election programmatic benefits to districts (or groups of
voters) who are willing to swing their vote (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996; Keefer and
Vlaicu 2008).
29 The source of the data on vote shares is Beck et al. (2001). In non-election years, vote
share is coded as the vote share gained by the incumbent in the most recent election.
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Figure 3: The election date effect for different vote shares gained by the incumbent























































































































































Notes: The point estimates with 95% confidence intervals show the predicted marginal effects of Legisla-
tive election or Executive election on the growth rate of M1 for different values of the level and square of
the share of votes gained by the incumbent government party (coalition) or the president, respectively.
The sample is restricted to non-OECD and OECD countries in upper and lower sub-figures, respectively.
The bars indicate the density of votes gained and are measured on the right-hand y-axis. The underlying
regressions are reported in Table A7 in the supplementary material.
of an election is, partly, a function of the amount of ex ante vote buying. Figure 3 (c)
and (d) show that the election date effect is insignificant irrespective of the “closeness”
of the election in the sample of OECD countries.
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4.4 Consumption expenditures and elections: evidence from
Armenia
One of the mechanisms through which vote buying can affect M1 is that cash hoarded
in the black economy gets dispersed to a large number of voters who spend the cash
which subsequently, when deposited by retailers and shopkeepers, finds its way back to
the banking system. A necessary condition for this effect to operate is that household
consumption expenditures increase around elections indicating that extra income is being
spent.
In this section, we present micro-econometric evidence to substantiate this aspect of
the vote buying hypothesis. The idea, which was first developed by Mitra et al. (2017)
in a study of vote buying in India, is to use household survey data to look for an in-
crease in consumption around elections.30 It is not possible to implement this approach
in a cross-national panel setting as the required survey data are not available for enough
countries. We, therefore, focus on a particular country and have, for two reasons, chosen
the Republic of Armenia. Firstly, the structure of the Armenian household survey with
its daily recording is particularly well-suited for this investigation. Secondly, anecdotal
evidence on vote buying in Armenia is abundant. The 2012 Human Rights Report issued
by the US Department of State (US Department of State 2012), for example, describes
that year’s parliamentary election as “competitive”, but with significant violations, in-
cluding “credible allegations of vote buying”. The local media were also full of allegations
of vote buying, reporting typical “prices” in the range from 5,000 to 10,000 Armenian
Dram (AMD) per vote (10 to 20 USD)31 and which was said to have reached up to five
hundred thousand voters in a country with a population of less than 3 million and around
1.5 million registered voters (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2012).
30 See also Gillitzer and Prasad (2018).
31 See, e.g., Aravot Daily (2012).
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4.4.1 The survey data
We draw on the annual waves of the Integrated Survey of Living Standards (ISLS) for the
period 2001 to 2016 (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2018). The
ISLS collects data on consumption, income and various socio-demographic variables from
a representative sample of Armenian households. Between 4,000 and 8,000 households
are surveyed every year. The sample is redrawn yearly and so the same households are
not followed from one year to the next. An important feature of the survey is that the
sampled households fill a diary out daily. This diary collects information on purchases
of consumption items dis-aggregated into detailed product categories. Each surveyed
household fills in the diary for one month and trained interviewers visit the households
multiple times during that month to ensure timely and correct entries. The households,
on average, submit 28.6 days of information. The overall data set is a sequence of repeated
yearly across sections with a total of 95,779 households and 2,734,856 observations, but
within a month in a given year, we can track the consumption of the same household on
multiple days.
Between 2001 and 2016, Armenia held three parliamentary (2003, 2007, and 2012)
and four presidential elections (2003 with two rounds, 2008, and 2013).32 The Armenian
household survey is conducted throughout a calendar year. This means that within a
year households start their one month of daily records of consumption at different times.
In contrast to many other consumption surveys, this allows us to study the consumption
patterns of those households that were surveyed in the days and weeks around each
election. An additional advantage is that, unlike the data used, for example, by Mitra
et al. (2017), the survey records consumption expenditures daily for the same household.
32 Our empirical strategy cannot accommodate situations where more than one election
is held within an interval of 80 days (as we detail below). For this reason, the second
round of the 2003 presidential election and the 2003 parliamentary election, both of
which followed the first round of the presidential election in 2003, are excluded.
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We can, therefore, not only study finely timed (daily) consumption patterns but we can
also control for unobserved household fixed effects.
4.4.2 Identification strategy
As in Mitra et al. (2017), we hypothesize that if vote buying occurs, then it should be
reflected in household consumption patterns. According to the permanent income hy-
pothesis, rational households with access to a perfect capital market do not react to
anticipated income shocks and respond to unanticipated ones by smoothing consumption
over their life-cycle. In such a world, extra income from vote buying, whether anticipated
or not, will have no or little immediate effect on consumption. However, many of the
households that “sell” their vote are poor and face liquidity constraints. Such house-
holds will respond to both anticipated and unanticipated income shocks by increasing
consumption.33
We do not know the exact timing of vote buying activity, except that they will have
to take place before the election, nor do we know precisely when any extra income might
be converted into extra consumption. We, therefore, specify an empirical model that
allows us to study the timing of potential consumption responses in a flexible manner
with different time windows. In particular, we follow Mitra et al. (2017) and specify
a differences-in-differences model but with daily intervals around the election date. To
create the treatment group (which is treated to income shocks from vote buying), we start
33 This is demonstrated by a large literature that studies the effects of various
anticipated and unanticipated income shocks on consumption behavior (Parker 1999;
Stephens Jr 2003; Johnson et al. 2006; Stephens and Unayama 2011; Mian and Sufi
2012; Aaronson et al. 2012; Parker et al. 2013; Agarwal et al. 2017). For reviews, see
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) and Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2016).
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Figure 4: Example of how the before/after and control/treatment groups are con-
structed.
Notes: The treatment to the election ends 14 days after the election day (the cut-off). The treatment
group consists of households that filled in daily diaries 2∗δ days before the cut-off. The households are in
the “after” group during the [0, δ) days before the cut-off (which is set at 14 days after the election) and
in the “before” group during the [δ, 2∗δ] day before the cut-off. The control group consists of households
that filled in daily diaries on the same days as the treatment group but in the year before and after the
election year.
by defining a cut-off of 14 days after an election34 and count 2 ∗ δ days backwards in time
from that cut-off. All the households that fill in a daily diary within this time window
of 2 ∗ δ days are in the treatment group. We assume that a treated household is in the
“after” group during the [0, δ) days and in the “before” group during the [δ, 2 ∗ δ] before
the cut-off. Figure 4 visualizes this approach. For example, if δ is equal to 20 days, then
the households in the treatment group are treated (the “after” group) during the 6 days
before and 14 days after the election and untreated (the “before” group) during the 20
days prior to that (i.e., the “before” period starts 26 and ends 6 days before the election).
By varying δ between 4 and 40, we can split the treatment group into different “before”
and “after” group and in that way create different treatment windows around the election.
For example, for δ = 40 the treatment starts 66 days before the election while for δ = 4
the treatment window is much shorter and starts 10 days after the election. To construct
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the control group, Mitra et al. (2017) take advantage of the staggered nature of elections
across Indian states and use neighboring states without elections as the control group.
Since we study national elections that are held on the same day everywhere, we cannot
follow that approach. Instead, our control group consists of the households surveyed on
the same dates (2∗δ days) as the treatment group but in the year before and the year after
the election year. Table A8 reports sample sizes for the control and treatment groups
for the maximum time window of 80 days (δ = 40). In this case, the combined sample
consists of about 570 thousand daily observations from about 25.8 thousand households.
The differences-in-differences specification that we estimate for different values of δ is:






βl ∗DOYl + θi + εit,
(2)
where i is the index for a household and t is the index for calendar days and Yit is a
consumption outcome of interest (see below). The dummy variable Treated(δ)it is coded
1 for the households that for a given interval of 2 ∗ δ days belong to the treatment
group and zero otherwise and the dummy variable After(δ)it is coded 1 for the δ days
round the election where the treated households are subject to the “election treatment”.
The coefficient of interest is α3 which captures the average treatment effect (ATE) on
consumption. As in Stephens Jr (2003), we include day of the week, DOW , and day
of the year, DOY , fixed effects to ensure that our results are not biased by particular
dates (such as Christmas) or certain days of the week (as elections are not always held
on a specific weekday). Importantly, the specification includes household-specific fixed
effects. The former control for household specific attributes like income, family size,
number of adults, etc. ε is the error term clustered at the level of households. Under the
34 We have chosen 14 days after the election as the cut-off as this will give the
households a couple of weeks to spend the extra income they may get prior to the
election.
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parallel trends assumption that the expenditures during the days where we suspect the
income from vote buying is spent would have been the same for the treated households
as the consumption expenditures of the control households over the corresponding days
in non-election years, we can interpret α3 as an unbiased average treatment effect (ATE).
The outcome variable, Y , is daily expenditures on various consumption goods, measured
in Armenian Dram (AMD). We focus on total food consumption and the eight food
categories listed in Table 3.35 We observe that at the median food is about 13% of
household income but that this share varies substantially across the income distribution.
4.4.3 Results
We present the results in a sequence of diagrams. Figure 5(a) plots the average responses
of total food purchases to the election treatment and Figure 5(b) plots the responses
separately for the four income quartiles. In each diagram, the horizontal axis records
different values of δ between 4 and 40 in bins of two days. For each value of δ, the point
estimate of α3 from equation (2), which captures the average treatment effect of elections
on consumption, is indicated with a circle and the bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The election day is denoted with a vertical line (at δ = 14). To understand how to read
the diagram, take, for example, a value of δ = 20. The corresponding point estimate
represents a scenario where the before treatment period starts 26 days and ends 6 days
before the election, and the treatment period starts 6 days before and ends 14 days after
the election.
Figure 5(a) shows that total food consumption increases significantly around elections.
The largest effect is for a treatment period of 6 days before and 14 days after the election
(δ = 20) where daily consumption of food increases by 100 AMD, which corresponds
to a 7% increase, or a total of 2000 AMD (for the 20 days). The smallest (significant)
treatment effect (for δ = 14) is 50 AMD per day or 700 AMD over the 14 days in this
35 We study food consumption because these items are purchased at a high frequency
and, therefore, recorded in the daily diaries for most days.
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Table 3: Monthly budget and expenditure shares, food consumption
Full sample Control group Treatment group
Median 10%-ile 90%-ile Median 10%-ile 90%-ile Median 10%-ile 90%-ile
Budget share of food 12.7% 4.5% 56% 13.3% 4.5% 58.3% 13.7% 4.7% 72.6%
Expenditure shares:
Starch products 28,4% 8,8% 52,9% 28,9% 8,1% 54,7% 27,0% 7,2% 53,2%
Meat and fish products 19,6% 4,0% 38,0% 21,5% 4,3% 40,9% 22,8% 5,6% 41,7%
Dairy products 8,1% 0,0% 17,8% 7,5% 0,0% 17,5% 7,3% 0,0% 17,7%
Fruits and vegetables 12,9% 0,8% 27,9% 9,4% 0,0% 22,2% 9,1% 0,0% 22,9%
Sugar and confectionery 6,1% 1,1% 16,0% 6,4% 1,2% 16,0% 6,5% 1,3% 15,9%
Other food products 14,8% 6,7% 27,5% 15,4% 6,7% 29,3% 15,3% 6,4% 29,4%
Non-alcoholic drinks 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 4,3%
Alcoholic drinks 0,0% 0,0% 4,5% 0,0% 0,0% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 7,2%
Note: The control and treatment groups are defined for a time window of δ = 40 days. The summary
statistics are different but not substantially so for other values of δ. We report the budget share of
food (total food expenditure in percentage of income) and expenditure shares (expenditure on an item
in percentage of total consumption expenditure) at the median, tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the
household income distribution.
window. These effects are substantial compared to average food purchases of 1,497 AMD
per day and the size of the effect is not very different to that reported by Mitra et al.
(2017) for Indian elections.36
Figure 5(b), which consists of four sub-diagrams, one for each income quartile, shows
that the consumption response to the election treatment is concentrated among house-
holds in the second quartile of the income distribution, i.e., towards the bottom of the
income distribution but not among the very poor. Responses for households in the other
quartiles are positive prior to elections but generally not statistically different from zero
36 They report a 10% increase in spending on pulses prior to Indian elections.
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Figure 5: Estimates of the ATE for total food expenditures, aggregated and by income
quartile
(a) Average responses
(b) Responses by income quartile
Note: The diagrams plot the point estimates (the dots) of the average treatment effect (ATE) (α3) from
equation 2 for different values of δ (treatment windows) as recorded on the x-axis. The bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 6: Estimates of the ATE for eight food-related consumption items
(a) Starch products (b) Meat and fish
(c) Other food (d) Fruits and vegetables
(e) Dairy products (f) Sugar and confectionery
(g) Non-alcoholic drinks (h) Alcoholic drink
Note: See the notes to Figure 5
Table 4: Summary of ATE estimates by item and income quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Is there a significant effect? Which direction?
Average Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
Total food purchases + +
Starch products - +
Meat and fish + + + -
Other food + +
Fruits and vegetables + + + + +
Dairy products -
Sugar and confectionery + + +
Non-alcoholic drinks + + +
Alcoholic drink + + + + -
Note: The Table summarizes the results of estimating equation (2) for eight consumption categories on
average (column 1) and by household income quartile (columns 2-5). The results are based on graphs
reported in Figures 5, 6 and A1 (in the supplementary material). A + indicates a significant increase
and a − indicates a significant decrease in at least one day within the treatment window around the
election.
(at the 5% level). For households in the second quartile, the treatment effect is 200 AMD,
i.e., twice as large as the average effect.
Figure 6 dis-aggregates food consumption into eight categories and shows their re-
sponses to the election treatment. The diagrams show that household consumption in-
creases around the election in all but two categories (starch and dairy products). The
strongest responses are found in the consumption of fruits and vegetables and alcohol
which increase by, respectively, around 15% and 20%. In the supplementary material
(Figure A1), we report the corresponding results dis-aggregated by income quartile and
Table 4 provides a summary. Again, we observe that the ATE is positive and significant
among households at the bottom of the income distribution, with the exception of fruits
and vegetables and other food where the top quartiles are also affected.
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In summary, the average Armenian household experiences an abnormal increase in
consumption around elections. The effect is between 700 and 2,000 AMD and, for most
consumption items, the effect is concentrated among households towards the bottom of
the income distribution. Vote buying is a potential source of the income needed to fund
this extra consumption. In supplementary appendix D, we show how the micro evidence
from Armenia can be reconciled with the macro evidence on the election date effect.
5 Conclusions
This paper offers a new perspective on the monetary effects of elections by studying
monthly data on M1. We report robust evidence of a systematic monetary expansion
during the election and post-election months in a sample of up to 104 non-OECD countries
between 1975 and 2015. The expansion amounts to about 1/13th of a standard deviation
in the month-to-month growth rate of M1. We cannot find a similar effect in mature
OECD democracies. This stylized fact is new to the literature on monetary political
business cycles.
We propose the vote buying hypothesis to explain this short-run monetary cycle. Large-
scale, systematic vote buying creates a spike in the demand for money timed around the
election, which through conversion of broader monetary instruments (from M2 or M3 to
M1) or through black economy returns to the banking system leading to an endogenous
expansion of M1 around elections. Although we cannot provide conclusive proof that this
is the mechanism behind the observed cycle in M1, we present comprehensive evidence
that bolster the credibility of the hypothesis. We find that the cycle is most pronounced
in elections which are reported by independent election monitors to be affected by vote
buying and other irregularities and absent in elections that are assessed to be free and
fair. Moreover, the election-date effect in monetary expansion is stronger in close elections
where political competition is intense and, hence, vote buying particularly rewarding for
candidates. We also present micro-econometric evidence from Armenia of an increase in
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consumption around elections. The magnitude of this increase could have been funded
by income from selling votes and is also similar to the size of the monetary expansion.
Our findings complement the literature on monetary political business cycles by point-
ing to the role of passive monetary developments that do not require any monetary policy
decisions. This obviously allows for new avenues for monetary political cycles even in
democracies where central banks are independent from political influence. Our approach
also opens up potentially useful ways to quantify vote buying and electoral corruption
more generally.
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Table A4: Heterogenity in the election date effect: Legislative and executive elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ∆lnM1
SAMPLE Non-OECD OECD
Election month 0.0061*** -0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0020)
Legislative election 0.0018 0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0022)
Executive election 0.0074* -0.0065
(0.0039) (0.0049)
Legislative & executive elections 0.0160*** -0.0094
(0.0047) (0.0064)
Observations 16,034 16,034 16,034 16,034 5,227 5,227 5,227 5,227
R-squared 0.1353 0.1348 0.1350 0.1354 0.2723 0.2722 0.2724 0.2725
Countries 98 98 98 98 17 17 17 17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, the exchange rate, resource rents,
polity index of democracy, new democracy dummy; include three lags of the dependent variable and
country, year and month fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered
at the level of countries. The sample in columns (1) to (4) is the same as in Table 1, column (5).
Legislative election is coded one in months with a legislative election only and zero otherwise; Executive
election is coded one in months with an excecutive election only; and Legislative & executive elections
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A7: The election date effect interacted with central bank independence (CBI)
index, Polity IV index of democracy, and vote shares gained by the incumbent
party or the president
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆lnM1
Sample OECD & non-OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD OECD
Election type Legislative &/or Executive Legislative Executive
Election month 0.0034 -0.0186** -0.0024 -0.0230 -0.0185 -0.0782





Polity IV -0.0029 0.0342*** -0.0066 -0.0076 -0.0073* -0.0476*
(0.0035) (0.0125) (0.0040) (0.0081) (0.0043) (0.0207)
x Election 0.0788**
(0.0367)




Vote share -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009)
x Election 0.0004 0.0008 0.0011 0.0027
(0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0022)
Vote share square 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
x Election -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
GDP pc (log) 0.0004*** -0.0156*** -0.0145*** -0.0099*** -0.0178*** -0.0087
(0.0001) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0048) (0.0075)
GDP pc growth -0.0114*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0005*** 0.0004
(0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Inflation 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Exchange rate (log) -0.0021*** 0.0001 -0.0029*** -0.0002 -0.0033** 0.0062
(0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0056)
Resources rents / GDP 0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0011* 0.0005*** 0.0011
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0007)
New democracy -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0021 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0019
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012)
M1 growth (t-1) -0.0027 -0.1166*** -0.0755*** -0.0010 -0.0723*** -0.0988
(0.0034) (0.0160) (0.0222) (0.0012) (0.0185) (0.0708)
M1 growth (t-2) 0.0001 -0.0291*** -0.0144** 0.0005 -0.0195** -0.0620
(0.0013) (0.0104) (0.0062) (0.0007) (0.0097) (0.0376)
M1 growth (t-3) 0.0037* -0.0076 -0.0086 0.0035 -0.0236** 0.0660
(0.0022) (0.0119) (0.0070) (0.0021) (0.0113) (0.0679)
Observations 18,763 18,348 10,949 4,557 11,249 1,682
R-squared 0.1650 0.1366 0.1830 0.2576 0.1983 0.4423
Countries 87 114 76 17 65 6
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include country, year and month fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries. For graphical presentation of the marginal effects of columns
(1) to (2) and (3) to (6) see Figures 1 and 3, respectively.
Table A8: Sample statistics for Armenian survey study
Full sample Control group Treatment group
Number Share Number Share Number Share
No. of observations 2,734,856 100% 383.987 14.0% 186.155 6.8%
No. of households 95.779 100% 17.727 18,6% 8.074 8,4%
Obs. in after group - - 206.213 53.7% 99.621 53.5%
of control of treatment
Note: The full sample pools together all observations from the 2001 to 2016 waves of the Integrated
Survey of Living Standards. The table assumes that δ = 40. The treatment group limits the sample
to households surveyed 66 days before and 14 days after an election, and the control group consists of
households surveyed within the same 80 days window as the treatment group but in the year before and
the year after the election year. The sizes of the two groups will be different for other values of δ.
Figure A1: Consumption responses by income quartile
(a) Starch products (b) Meat and fish
(c) Other food (d) Fruits and vegetables
(e) Dairy products (f) Sugar and confectionery
(g) Non-alcoholic drinks (h) Alcoholic drink
Online Appendix B: Survey and case study evidence
In this section we present survey evidence on vote buying from Latin American and
African Barometers and from the World Values Survey, as well as case studies illuminating
the relationship between vote buying and election day monetary expansions.
Survey evidence on the extent of vote buying
One might ask if vote buying really occurs on a scale that could, in principle, induce
macroeconomic effects. Survey evidence suggests that it does. Figure B1 reports data
from the Afro- and Latino-barometers and from the World Values Survey (WVS) on the
fraction of survey respondents who report that they themselves or other people they know
were offered to sell their vote during elections. The exact questions vary from survey to
survey making it hard to compare them in a consistent way. Thus, the statistics should
be treated with care.
The average share of people reporting having been offered something in return for
their vote is about 17% in Africa and about 8% in Latin America, with the percentage of
voters knowing of someone else being bribed being considerably higher (25% in Latino-
barometer and over 50% in the WVS). In some countries, e.g., Benin, Uganda and the
Dominican Republic, close to half the population reports knowledge of vote buying.1 It
is clear from these data that vote buying is widespread in many parts of the world, in
particular in African democracies (see also, Collier and Vicente 2012). The amounts of
money spent on vote buying is also substantial. For example, Phongpaichit et al. (2000)
estimate that, during Thailand’s 1996 election, 30% of the electorate was offered cash in
exchange for votes, with an average offer of $27. In Taiwan, many voters were offered
about $10 for a vote during the 1993 election (Wang and Kurzman 2007). Based on a
household survey, Finan and Schechter (2012, p. 869) estimate that in Paraguay during
1Social desirability bias suggests that voters tend to under-report having received money or gifts in
exchange for their vote (see, e.g., Corstange 2012). The work by Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) on
Nicaraguan municipal elections shows that the bias can be very big: in a survey-based list experiment,
24% of the voters were offered a “gift” in exchange for their vote, but only 2% reported this fact when
asked afterwards in a survey.
the 2006 municipal election voters were offered, on average, $48 in exchange for their
vote.
Case study evidence on the monetary effects of elections
Most central banks report monthly or annual data on M1 and few publish weekly or
daily data. These data series allow us to track monetary movements around elections with
varying degrees of accuracy. Figure B2 reports data on M1 or related monetary aggregates
around elections in six selected countries: Nigeria, Bolivia, Venezuela, Indonesia, Lebanon
and the USA.2 The dark bar in each panel indicates the election day, week or month.
NIGERIA 2007. The 2007 presidential election marked the first transition from one
elected leader to another in the largest country in Africa. Many observers noted that
vote buying, along with electoral violence and fixes to falsify vote tallies, were common
currency in this and other Nigerian elections (Lucky 2013; Collier and Vicente 2014).
In an Afro-barometer survey undertaken half-way through the election campaign, 12% of
the interviewed acknowledged, that they had been offered something in return for their
vote (Bratton 2008, p. 623). As one might expect in an economy awash with oil money,
voters are usually offered money in exchange for their vote. The going price for a vote
was around 500 Naira or about $4.3 Figure B2(a) shows how M1 evolved before and after
the elections held in April 2007. We observe a clear increase in March with a peak in
April. After the election, M1 fell back to its normal level.
BOLIVIA 2009. The 2009 elections took place in a violence-free environment and saw
the highest turnout rate in Bolivia’s history. The elections ended with a clear victory
for the incumbent president Evo Morales, who obtained 64.1% of votes. Monitors from
the European Union characterized the elections as generally free and fair, but they also
confirmed the misuse of state resources. The international press reported that “cash
2The elections in the five low and middle income countries were chosen because of abundance of
circumstantial evidence of vote buying. The 2012 election in the USA was chosen to illustrate the stark
difference between established OECD and low and middle income non-OECD countries. The selection
is obviously not random and we do not pretend that it is representative.
3See Bratton (2008, p. 624).
Figure B1: The extent of vote buying in Africa (2010-2012), Latin America (2002) and
WVS
(a) Afro-barometer: And during the last national election in [year], how often, if ever did a
candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in
























































































































































At least once was offered money in return for your vote (%)
(b) Latino-barometer: Have you known of someone in the last elections who was pressured
or received something to change his vote in a certain way? Has this happened to you?
































































































Bribery in Latin American presidential elections
2002: interviewee 2002: other people
2005: other people 2006: other people






























































































































































































Very or fairly often country's elections voters are bribed (%)
Notes: Data for Dominican Republic is from the survey wave of 2005. Sources: Afro−barometer (2015);
Latino−barometer (2015).
Figure B2: Movements in monetary aggregates by day, week or month during selected
elections in six countries.
(a) Nigeria 2007 (million NGN) (b) Bolivia 2009 (million BOB)
(c) Venezuela 2012 (billion VEF) (d) Indonesia 2014 (billion IDR)
(e) Lebanon 2009 (billion LBP) (f) USA 2012 (billion USD)
Notes: The data on the monetary aggregates come from the respective national central banks and are
in units of the local currency. Panel (a) reports currency in circulation outside of banks; panels (b) and
(f) report M1; and panels (d), (e) and (f) report currency in circulation.
handouts for poor families ..... and heavy social spending” were all helping Morales get
re-elected (Reuters 2009). Survey data suggest that about 10% of the voting population
in Bolivia find vote buying acceptable (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014). Figure B2(b)
shows the movement of M1 by week around the 2009 election. We observe a significant
increase between the fourth week of November and the election held in the second week
of December.
VENEZUELA 2012. After the 2009 constitutional amendment that abolished presi-
dential term limits, Hugo Chavez could, after 14 years in power, run as the presidential
candidate for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) for the third consecutive
time in October 2012. He was reelected by 55% of the popular vote in an election with a
turnout of over 80% and in which 20 to 40% of Venezuelans are reported to doubt that
election anonymity is guaranteed.4 As the incumbent, Chavez effectively exploited the
apparatus of the Venezuelan state to help secure this result (Economist, July 7, 2012).
One common strategy was to use patronage power to award jobs, contracts, and subsidies
to supporters. The Financial Times5 reports that central government spending grew by
41.1% in real terms in the led-up to the election, and that much of this increase went to-
wards wage increases and construction. In a country where the central bank is also under
government control much of this appears to have been funded by direct transfers from
the central bank to the off-budget fund called the National Development Fund (known
as Fonden) that Chavez used to finance his popular social programs. The monetary con-
sequences of this are visible in Figure B2(c) which shows the movement of M1 by week
around the October election. We observe more than a doubling of the outstanding stock
of money between the third week of September and the election held in the second week
of October.
INDONESIA 2014. Indonesians voted in two elections in 2014, first, on the 9th of
April for the parliament, and second, on the 8th of July for the president. A survey
by Jakarta-based pollster Indikator reported that 41,5% of 15,600 people interviewed
“find it acceptable for politicians to hand out money or staples like rice or oil, as part
of campaigning” (Jakarta Post 2014). In the region of East Java, for example, a candi-
date admitted to paying 117 million Indonesian rupiah (over $10,000) to 13 sub-district
committee members in exchange for 5,000 votes. Media reports indicate that these inter-
mediaries (called “korlap” by the locals) typically hand out 50,000 to 100,000 Indonesian
4SeeAngeby et al. (2012).
5http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/09/25/venezuelas-pre-election-spending-spree-saps-
exchange-reserves/
rupiah (about $4-8) per vote. Figure B2(c) shows the movement of M1 in the weeks
around the two elections. We observe a jump of around 100 billion Indonesian rupiah
(or by 20%) in the month of the presidential election. Interestingly, the Central Bank
of Indonesia reports data on the circulation of different denominations of its banknotes.
From the bolded line in Figure B2(d), which graphs the circulation of banknotes with a
nominal value of 50,000 Indonesian rupiahs, we see an increase of over 20% in July, while
the circulation of coins with nominal values of 1,000 rupiahs is constant (the dotted line).
Given that the typical price of a vote is reported to be in the range between 50,000 to
100,000 rupiahs, this pattern is consistent with widespread vote buying.
LEBANON 2009. Lebanon held a relatively peaceful parliamentary election in June
2009. Allegations of vote buying were abundant. The New York Times reported that
the election could “shape up to be amongst the most expensive ever held anywhere, with
hundreds of millions of dollars streaming into this small country [of only four million
people] from around the globe” (New York Times 2009). The headline of the June 2
issue of the Globalpost, “Going rate for a vote in Lebanon? $700”, gives an indication
of the inflated prices at which votes apparently were sold (Globalpost 2009). Trans-
parency International and Lebanese Transparency Association (2009) claimed that “the
value of a vote varied from $60 to $100 in Saida, $800 in Zahle, up to $3,000 in Zghorta”.
Corstange (2012) uses survey data and a list experiment to show that over half of the
Lebanese voters sold their votes in the 2009 election. Figure B2(e) shows the movement
in M1 around the election month. We observe a big, positive spike in June.
The examples from Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Lebanon along with Ar-
menia discussed in the main text are suggestive that there is an association between vote
buying and the supply of money centered on the election day. It is clear, however, that
these countries are not a random sample of electoral democracies: They are “young”
democracies and their political institutions are comparably weak.6 Cross-country stud-
6The Freedom House index of political rights is coded on a scale from 1 to 7 with seven being the worst
and one being the best. Lebanon scores 5, Bolivia 4, Indonesia 2 and Nigeria 4 (Freedom House 2012).
ies reveal a strong association between weak political institutions and vote buying, in
particular amongst “young” democracies (Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).
Insofar as the correlation between the monetary aggregates and the timing of elections,
shown in the diagrams above, is related to vote buying, we would not expect to find similar
effects in countries with strong political institutions. Figure B2(f) shows the movement
of M1 in the USA around the election in 2012. If anything, it looks like M1 is lower in
the election week than in the preceding ones.
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Online Appendix C: The monetary mechanisms
Our empirical results show that elections have a positive short-run effect on the supply
of M1 in the month of the election and in the post-election month. To understand the
source of this short-run effect on M1, we develop in this appendix a simple textbook
model of a money market with a fractional banking sector.
The model
The equilibrium in the money market describes the level of real money balances held by
the private sector, either as cash or as deposits in the commercial banks. The economy
has a central bank that issues reserves (the monetary base) either through open market
operations as nonborrowed reserves (Rnb) or as borrowed reserves (or discount loans) (Rb)
issued through its discount mechanism which enables the commercial banks to borrow
reserves from the central bank at the refinancing (or discount) rate (rd). The monetary
base (the total reserves) of the economy is Rb + Rnb. The monetary base is used in three
ways: it is held as required reserves by the commercial banks (Rr), as excess reserves
(Re) also held by the banks, or as cash held by the public C. The nonborrowed reserves
supplied by the Central Bank to the economy through its open market operations can be
expressed as
Rnb = Rr + Rf + C, (1)
where Rf = Re−Rb are the free reserves held by the commercial banks, not owed to the
central bank. The free reserves are an increasing function of the difference between the
market interest rate r and the refinancing rate, i.e., Rf (r − rd) with ∂Rf∂(r−rd) > 0.
The money supply (M1) is the currency in the hands of the public outside the com-
mercial banks plus their demand deposits in the banks. We assume that there are two
types of agents in the economy, index by i ∈ {1, 2}, and which we call the hoarders (i = 1)
and the traders (i = 2) for reasons that will become clear later. The part of M1 held by
type i is M1i with M1 =
∑
i M1i. The two types differ with respect to the fraction of its
money it wants to hold in cash (Ci) and as deposits (Di)
Ci = hiM1i (2)
Di = (1− hi) M1i, (3)
where hi is the fraction of money that type i holds in cash. The hoarders hold all their
cash outside the banks so h1 = 1, while the traders hold deposit accounts and h2 < 1.
The hoarders hold their money in cash either because they are excluded from the banking
system (say, because of poverty) or because their money is earned illegally and they want
the holdings kept secret. The commercial banks are required by law to hold a faction of








We can derive the relationship between the supply of M1 and the nonborrowed reserves
supplied by the central bank through open market operations by combining equations (1),
(2) and (4) to get











z + h2(1− z)
, (6)
and the total supply of money (M1) as
M1 = M12 + M11 =
Rnb −Rf −M11
z + h2(1− z)
+ M11. (7)
We observe that the money supply (M1) depends positively on the reserves supplied
by the central bank through open market operations (Rnb), negatively on the excess
reserves held by the commercial banks (Rf ), and, as a new feature, on how much cash is




z + h2(1− z)
< 0 (8)
as the money multiplier ( 1
z+h2(1−z)) of the fractional banking system is greater than one.
Since the free reserves are increasing in the market interest rate and decreasing in the
refinancing rate, the supply of money increases with r and falls with rd.
We model the demand for money (M1) with a Keynesian liquidity preference function
L(r, y, v), where the demand for real money balances is a negative function of the market
interest rate, and a positive function of the level of activity in the economy y. The
parameter v represents a demand shifter. The equilibrium in the money market requires
M1(r − rd)
P
= L(r, y, v). (9)
In the very short-run, prices (P ) and the level of activity (y) can be taken as given.
Sources of short-run fluctuations in M1
The model can help us understand various sources of short-run fluctuations in the money
supply (M1) around elections. We can divide these into supply and demand side factors.
1. Supply side factors: The central bank may start an open market operation, fund
government spending directly, or lower its refinancing rate around elections. This
directly shifts the money supply curve out and increases the money held by the
public via a fall in the market interest rate.
2. Demand side factors: We highlight two types of demand shocks that could be
generated by elections
(a) Hoarded money returns to the banking sector: If those who hoard money
outside the banking system spend some of their cash and this cash ends up
in the commercial banks, it will increase the supply of money endogenous as
the banks expand their lending. In the model, this corresponds to a reduction
in the money holdings of the hoarders (M11 falls) and an increase in the
money holdings of the traders. From equation (8), we observe that this “swap”
increases M1 and shifts the money supply curve out.
(b) The demand for money increases through substitution from broad to narrow
money: This shifts the demand function out, increases the market interest
rate and encourages the banks to lower their free reserves. This expands M1
endogenously. This effect is reinforced if the central bank is concerned about
higher market interest rates (e.g., because it got a target rate) and expands
liquidity, either through open market operations or through the discount win-
dow.
These two demand effects can both be triggered by vote buying. First, if vote buying
is funded with hoarded cash money from the black economy and some of it enters the
banking system when it gets into the hands of the voters (corresponding to the “traders”
in the model), then this will cause an increase in M1 around the election. If the votes are
bought from voters without access to the banking system there will not be any immediate
effect on M1, but when they spent the money in shops and the shopkeepers deposit the
money in their bank accounts, the effect will show up with a delay. Second, if vote buying
means that the demand for cash money from within the banking system goes up around
elections, then the second effect will operate. This is what happens if broader assets not
included in M1 are sold for cash in the open market.
Online Appendix D: Reconciling the micro and macro
evidence
We present a “back of the envelope calculation” aimed at linking the micro-econometric
evidence on the consumption consequences of elections and the macro evidence on the
increase in money supply to each other and to vote buying. Assuming that all these
effects are, in fact, caused by vote buying, we proceed in three steps: (1) we calculate the
price of a vote implied by the consumption evidence; (2) we calculate the price of a vote
implied by the increase in money supply; and (3) we compare these to the vote prices
reported in the press.
In the previous section, we reported a statistically significant increase in food expen-
diture around elections. The minimum daily increase over a 14 days period is 50 AMD
and the maximum daily increase over a 20 days period is 100 AMD (see Figure 5a in the
text). This bounds the total increase in consumption expenditure on food between 700
and 2,000 AMD. On the (conservative) assumption that households spend (rather than
save) the windfall income they get from selling their votes1 and that they allocate that
extra income across the various consumption goods according to the observed budget
shares, we can calculate the implied increase in income required to fund the observed in-
crease in food consumption as the ratio of the budget share of food (13%) to the increase
in food expenditure. This gives us estimates of the required increase in income between
5,385 and 15,385 AMD for the average household or between 1,795 and 5,051 AMD for
the average voter.2 To get the “implied vote price”, we need to take into account that
only a subset of voters were bribed. According to Institute for War and Peace Reporting
(2012) a third of the 1.5 million Armenian voters were bribed in 2012. Based on the
1Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) report that the short-run marginal propensity to consume from both
anticipated and unanticipated income is high for poor and liquidity constrained households.
2The calculation is 700/0.13 and 2,000/0.13 for each household. The average number of voters in
each household is about 3.
Table D1: The election date effect in Armenia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES M1 (billion AMD)
Election month 4.6748***
(0.9424)
Election month (t-1) -0.5540
(0.9090)
Election month (t+1) -0.6808
(0.9058)
20 days around election 7.4266***
(1.4943)
20 days around election; 80 days control 5.1408***
(1.9006)
20 days around election; 40 days control 3.2973***
(1.1440)
Observations 5,935 5,887 5,912 4,171 735 367
R-squared 0.9942 0.9941 0.9941 0.9912 0.9931 0.9984
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. The dependent variable is the level of M1 measured
daily in billion AMD. Daily data are not available on weekends and holidays. All regressions include
year, month, week and day of the month fixed effects. “20 days around the election” corresponds to the
12 days before and the 6 days after each election; 80 days and 40 days control means that the comparison
group is restricted to, respectively, 80 and 40 days around the election date in election and non-election
years. All regressions control for year, month, week, and day of the month fixed effects.
consumption estimates we, therefore, arrive at an “implied vote price” in the range from
5,385 to 15,153 AMD.3
Next, we need to estimate the increase in money supply around elections in Armenia.
Unlike most central banks, the Central Bank of Armenia reports monetary statistics on
a daily basis. Using these data to back out the “implied vote prices”, we first estimate
the effect of elections on the level of M1. To account for seasonality, we include year,
3We calculate this as 1,795*1.5/0.5 and 5,051*1.5/0.5, respectively. If we assume that the marginal
propensity to consume is lower than one, then these estimates would be larger.
month, week, and day of the month fixed effects. The results are reported in Table D1.
We consider two “election treatments”. The first “treatments” is tailored to the approach
taken in Section 2 in the textto estimate the macroeconomic effect of elections. It uses
the days of election month as the “treatment” window and all other (non-election) days
in the sample as control. The results are reported in columns (1) to (3) for the election,
the pre-, and post-election month, respectively. The second “treatment” is tailored to the
approach taken in text to estimate the consumption effect of elections. It considers the
“treatment window” to be the 20 days around the elections during which the estimated
consumption effect is significant (see Figure 5 in the text). In column (4), we report
results for this “treatment window” where we use all other days as the control, while in
columns (5) and (6), we narrow the control to, respectively, 80 and 40 days around the
election date in election and non-election years. The total sample is available for the
period 1995:m12-2018:m8 in columns 1-3 (with ten national election), and is restricted to
the period 2001:m1-2016:m12 in columns 4-6 (with six national elections) as in the text.
Consistent with the vote buying hypothesis, Table D1 shows that the circulation of
money in the Armenian economy increases substantially during elections while there is
no effect in the pre- and post-election months. The increase in the supply of money
ranges from 3.30 to 7.43 billion AMD. Assuming that these increases were entirely due
to vote buying and that 500,000 voters were bribed, the “implied vote price” is between
6,595 to 14,860 AMD. These estimates are in the same range as the “implied vote prices”
calculated from the consumption responses (5,385 to 15,153 AMD).
As the final step, we can compare these “implied vote prices” to the vote prices
reported in the local media which were in the range from 5,000 to 10,000 AMD per vote
(e.g., Aravot Daily 2012). We observe that the vote prices reported in the local media,
those implied by the observed increase in the money supply, and those implied by the
consumption increase observed around the election are of the same order of magnitude.
It is, therefore, possible that the observed increase in the circulation of cash around the
election is related to vote buying and that black economy money re-entering the formal
banking system via the consumption channel plays an important role in linking the two.
Obviously, we do not claim that the results from Armenia (or any other case study) will
necessarily be representative for the countries in our macro sample. Nonetheless, the
Armenian case study provides another piece of evidence suggesting that at least part of
the increase in M1 that we observe around the world at election times is an indication
of vote buying.
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